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COURT OF APPEALS, 1962 TERM
proper only for state and federal action, municipalities will be on tenuous consti-
tutional ground if they attempt to legislate without express state authorization.
It would be desirable to give the decision that limitation since local efforts to
supplement state standards in many areas of public interest may be justified,




ATTORNEY-AccOUNTANT AGREEMENT TO SPLIT FEE ENFORCEABLE PROVIDED
EACH RENDERS SERVICES ONLY IN His RESPECTIVE FIELD
In the same written contract, Neubecker, the defendant, retained Glickman,
an accountant, and Blumenberg, an attorney to represent him in a tax matter
which involved a deficiency pending before a Federal Tax Court. Each was to
receive 12 of Y of the difference between the alleged deficiency and the amount
of the settlement. There was evidence that each person was to perform services in
his respective field. The deficiency was reduced by $625,000 through their
efforts. Blumenberg, as the assignee of Glickman and in his own right sued
Neubecker on the express contract and in quantum meruit. A judgment on the
express contract was rendered for $208,354.69. On defendant's appeal, the Appel-
late Division reversed and ordered a new trial for only the attorney's quantum
meruit count because the express contract contemplated the rendition of legal
services by a layman and because the contract was a fee splitting agreement
forbidden by the Penal Law.1 Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Blumenberg, the attorney, claimed that a suit on the express contract was per-
missible and Neubecker, the taxpayer, claimed that a suit in quantum meruit
should not be permitted because the equally guilty attorney should not be
benefited from the alleged illegal joint retainer. The Court of Appeals held,
reversed, new trial ordered for both causes of action. The Court decided that a
single agreement whereby a lawyer and an accountant were to receive an equal
amount of a contingent sum as their fees was enforceable provided each was to
render services in his respective field. Blumenberg v. Neubecker, 12 N.Y.2d
456, 191 N.E.2d 269, 240 N.Y.S.2d 730 (1963).
In order to protect the general public, it is necessary that those who practice
law in New York State meet minimum qualifications. The State not only regu-
lates licensed attorneys in regard to mtters of practice and compensation, but
also those who are not licensed. One aspect of the State's policy is to prohibit
people who are not attorneys, licensed in New York, from practicing law on
another's behalf in New York Courts of record and from holding themselves
1. N.Y. Penal Law § 276.
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out as attorneys 2 A layman who renders legal service is forbidden from receiv-
ing compensation by statute.3 In civil suits for compensation for legal services
rendered, the courts will accept as a defense the fact that the plaintiff is not a
licensed attorney in New York.4 The reception of a portion of a lawyer's fee by
a layman as an inducement for placing a claim or a demand in the lawyer's
control, is illegal.5 This illegality renders a contract by which the lawyer is to
split his fees with a layman for furnishing interested parties unenforceable.0
Recovery of compensation by an attorney on the express contract need not be
allowed where the express contract is forbidden by law7 or contrary to public
policy.8 But, the fact that the express contract of the attorney is against public
policy does not preclude the attorney from recovering the reasonable value of
his legal services through an action for quantum meruit.9 In another jurisdiction,
that State's policy was reflected when a joint contract entered into by a law
firm with a client was declared null, void and unenforceable in light of a statute
because one of the firm's contracting attorneys did not pay his license tax.10
The attorney is also governed by the canons of his profession. One of the
canons provides that "no division of fees for legal services is proper except
with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."" Ac-
cording to this canon, an attorney is permitted to retain an accountant on a
salary basis if his salary is not computed according to the fees received by the
attorney.12 The New York City Committee on Professional Ethics voiced the
opinion that it is a violation of Canon 34 if an attorney and accountant agree
to share a single fee.13 This canon was also applied where an attorney was
not permitted to retain a fee because "he performed no legal services and
assumed no responsibility.'1 4 In that case the court mentioned that Canon 34
was "entitled to the force of law."'I5 The Federal Tax Court has set down as
its policy for its bar the carrying on of practice in accord with the letter and
spirit of the Canons of the American Bar Association.' 6 In a disbarment pro-
ceeding, Matter of Welch, a retainer contract was said to be void where an
attorney contracted with a client that he would split up part of his contingent
2. N.Y. Penal Law § 270; see People v. Alfani, 227 N.Y. 334, 125 N.E. 671 (1919).
3. N.Y. Penal Law §§ 271, 272.
4. Fein v. Ellenbogen, 84 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1948); Woodard v. South-
ampton Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 161 N.Y.S.2d 522, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
5. N.Y. Penal Law § 276; S. Stern, Henry & Co. v. McDermott, 38 Misc. 2d 50, 236
N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
6. In re Martin's Estate, 178 Misc. 43, 33 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
7. N.Y. Judiciary Law § 474.
8. Delahunty v. Canfield, 118 App. Div. 883, 103 N.Y. Supp. 939 (1st Dep't 1907).
9. Matter of Snyder, 190 N.Y. 66, 82 N.E. 742 (1907).
10. McIver v. Clarke, 69 Miss. 408, 10 So. 581 (1892).
11. A.BA. Canons of Professional Ethics 34.
12. A.B.A. Op. No. 297 (1961); see 47 A.B.A.J. 527, 528 (1961).
13. Bar Ass'n City of New York, Committee on Professional Ethics, Op. No. 614
(1942).
14. Matter of Annunziato, 201 Misc. 971, 973, 108 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
15. Id. at 973, 108 N.Y.S.2d at 103.
16. Fed. Tax Ct. R. 2.
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fee with doctors who examined the client.17 In another jurisdiction, it was
declared that splitting an attorney's fee with a layman for non-legal investiga-
tive services was against public policy in light of a statute.' 8 In a federal court
a contract for the equal division of an attorney's fee with a layman for non-legal
services rendered in searching for witnesses to testify has been adjudicated
contrary to sound public policy without reliance on a statute.' 9
The Court of Appeals interpreted from the record that there was a jury
question as to whether or not the accountant had contemplated the rendition of
legal services. There was evidence of an understanding that the accountant
and attorney were to furnish services in their own respective fields. The benefit
to the taxpayer of an agreement of this type was emphasized. The public
interest was said to be supported by utilizing the services of both professions
in a tax case. Even though there was a single agreement for the fees of both
representatives and the contingent amount was to be in a lump sum, as long as
each person was to perform the services only of his respective field, the con-
tract is valid and enforceable.
The view of the dissent was that because the express contract was not in
accord with the Rules of the Tax Court or the Canons of Professional Ethics,
the express contract was against public policy and no suit should have been had
on the express contract. But the suit on the quantum meruit count would be
permitted.
The majority accepts, as its policy reason for not holding the contract
to be against public policy, the joint statement of the State Society of Certified
Public Accountants and the State Bar Association. These groups suggest "that
a lawyer and a certified public accountant working together on behalf of a
common client in the tax field constitute a very effective team."120 As long as
there is a strong policy to have attorneys and accountants cooperating with
each other and one profession does not infringe on the practice of the other,
the combined agreement should be allowed. This can effectuate good service
for the client and eliminate the necessity of negotiating fees in another contract.
But, as long as part of the contractual matter involves the rendition of legal
services, there lurks a danger that the accountant will venture into. that field.
In regard to the Welch case, that proceeding was for disbarment, and the
comment about the nullity of the contract, which contemplated the apportioning
of part of the lawyer's fee to a non-attorney, was dictum. Also, in that case,
the contract was tainted with an element of ambulance chasing. In the instant
case, the danger of an attorney splitting his fee with an accountant for leads
is present. But, the risk of illegal and unfair methods appears not to be so
great in light of the benefit to the taxpayer. Here, there is proof that Glickman,
17. Matter of Welch, 156 App. Div. 470, 475, 141 N.Y. Supp. 381, 385 (lst Dep't
1913) (dictum). See also Matter of Coleman (Cohen), 256 App. Div. 262, 9 N.Y.S.2d
681 (1st Dep't 1939) (attorney censured for giving part of fee for doctor's testimony).
18. Cain v. Burns, 131 Cal. App. 2d, 439, 280 P.2d 888 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
19. Porter v. Jones, 176 F.2d 87, 89-90 (10th Cir. 1949).
20. N.Y. Judiciary Law, App. 328 (McKinney Supp. 1963).
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the accountant, was personally retained by the taxpayer and not by the attor-
ney. The attorney and accountant merely took a share of the recovery inde-
pendent of the other's fee. It is incidental that the fee of each is the same
percentage. But, this retainer agreement, since the money came from a lump
sum, may have been a technical departure from Canon 34. The policy reflected
in this case is not to deny recovery on the express contract for a technical
departure from Canon 34 in light of the evident beneficial results to the tax-
payer as long as the accountant does not render legal services. In light of this
decision, there is no indication whether the Court will or will not uphold an
agreement between a layman who renders non-legal services and an attorney to
split the attorney's fee, as where the attorney personally retains an accountant
whose salary is computed according to the attorney's fee.
Anthony S. Kowalski
CONTRACT INTENDED TO RELEASE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE INVALIDATED-
LANGUAGE NOT SUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT
The defendant is a manufacturer of motion picture film. A number of
reels of its film were sold to the plaintiff in standard packages on which were
printed certain conditions of sale stating, in part, that the film price did not
include processing, and that, except for replacement of the film, defendant
would not assume lability of any kind in any subsequent handling of the film.1
The plaintiff, in fulfillment of a contract with another party, traveled to Alaska,
exposed the film and returned it to defendant for processing. While in defend-
ant's possession, a substantial part of the film was damaged beyond usefulness.
The case was submitted to the Appellate Division on an agreed statement of
facts. 2 The Court held, first, that an inference of negligence was warranted and,
second, that the conditions of sale could not be construed so as to relieve de-
fendants of liability for negligence. In an appeal based on the latter point, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, since contracts purporting to absolve
the offeror from liability for negligence are not favored by the courts, and
must therefore meet strict standards of interpretation, the language of the
present coritract was not sufficiently clear to relieve the defendants of liability.
Willard Van Dyke Prods. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d
693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963).
The agreement involved here purported to release the offeror of future
liability for ordinary negligence. Although the rule applicable to such agree-
ments may generally be said to support their validity,3 considerations of policy
1. The relevant language is as follows: "This film will be replaced if defective in
manufacture, labeling, or packaging, or if damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company.
Except for such replacement, the sale or subsequent handling of this film for any purpose
is without warranty or other liability of any kind. Since dyes used with color films, like
other dyes, may, in time, change, this film will not be replaced for, or otherwise warranted
against, any change in color." Instant case at 303, 189 N.E.2d at 694, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 925, § 546.
3. See Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962
